

Sport and Politics: the question of legitimacy of international sport organizations

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Sport and Politics

Sport has more than health and recreational functions. It can also act as a socialization agent and help promote national identities as well as confer prestige on those identified with it. Sport can, in other words, create “political resources” (Allison 1986: 12). It is for this reason that governments, and not only in authoritarian regimes (Riordan 1991, Arnaud and Riordan 1998), do not hesitate to use sport whenever they think that it can help them. Even if governments were to ignore it, however, sport would still be a sphere of political activity. In one of the first essays to be written on sport and politics, Trevor Taylor advanced two definitions of “the political”: all that involves government or other public authorities or any activity which implies the use of power to shape the behavior of individuals or organizations (Taylor 1986). Both definitions make of sport a political activity.

Sport has traditionally been a self-managed sphere of activity. It was, and to a large extent still is, governed by a set of hierarchical organizations at the apex of which are what we call Global Sport Organizations (GSOs). Their names, and in some cases just

their initials (for example, IOC or FIFA) are familiar around the world. Although it is true that governments, at least those in democratic regimes, have generally abstained from claiming a direct role in the governance of sport, their interventions have nevertheless recently become more frequent in parallel with the growth of the economic significance of sport.¹ The most famous example is represented by the so-called “Bosman ruling” of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of the European Community (EC).² This ruling has definitively established that, sport being an economic activity, GSOs rules cannot be in contradiction with those established by the EC. The latter, in other words prime over those of the GSOs. Such a ruling has therefore made sport “political” in the sense that “public authorities” have become involved in it. Sport was already “political” in the sense that in regulating the activities of a given sport, GSOs had to reconcile conflicts arising with other sporting organizations (e.g. athletes’ associations). GSOs, in other words, exercise power, that is manage resources and control, modifying it when necessary, the behavior of other organizations and of individuals operating within a given sport.

GSOs and the question of legitimacy

¹ The economic significance of sport is enormous especially if the term “sport” is understood not only in terms of “sport events” but as the a sphere of activity including the production and consumption of a vast range of products connected with sport actors and events. The capital invested and circulating, the magnitude of revenues generated including its indirect economic impact, and the way sport activities are organized nationally and internationally, justify speaking of the existence of a global sport economy. Its significance, moreover, is more than economic since it embodies a set of cultural values with which individuals, whole communities, nations, and group of nations identify. In terms of participation and audience, the Olympic Games and the FIFA’s World Cup lay claim to be the world’s most important cultural events. Both of these aspects make sport “political” meaning a sphere of activity which appeals to, and invites the intervention of, political authorities.

² The “Bosman ruling” has invalidated FIFA and UEFA’s rules concerning the transfer of players out of contract and the limits on the number of “foreign” players (at least when the term was referred to players who were nationals of another EC member state) that a team could field in an official competition (Blanpain 1996, Parrish 2003, Croci 2001).

Notwithstanding their relevance and their notoriety, little attention has been paid to GSOs as a whole, at least by academics.³ Almost ritually in the growing literature on global governance (that is the organizations, mechanisms and processes which contribute to regulate global activities), sport organizations are mentioned, their significance noted, and then they are ignored. In her book on the “retreat of the state”, for instance, Susan Strange (1996: 96) noted that GSOs are “trans-national authorities which, more than states, manage various multinational sports and thereby affect the options open to participants, spectators, and those who provide the necessary finance”. In a collection of essays on how International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) contribute to build a world society, Boli and Thomas (1999: 46) have pointed out that “sports and leisure, above all, reify the world polity through ritualized global events”. Finally, in their study of the role of INGOs in global politics, Ronit and Schneider (2000: 20) have argue that “value-based forms of regulations not only build trust around the professions themselves but function as alternative to national legislation or international conventions ... [as] ... vividly illustrated through the efforts of private organizations in the area of sport”.

GSOs can be seen as a functional subset of INGOs. The latter are distinguished from International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) because they are set up and controlled by individuals and/or groups and not by national governments. INGOs differ in turn from Multinational Corporations (MNCs) because they operate within a different legal framework and because they have different objectives. MNCs are primarily engaged in economic activities for the pursuit of profit and regard their sphere of activity as separate from the political sphere. INGOs, instead, are usually formed in order to promote shared ideas and interests in specific functional issue-areas and regard their

³ One of the few exceptions is a book on FIFA by Sugden and Tomlinson (1998). The IOC has received for the most part very negative journalistic attention (e.g. Simson and Jennings 1992).

sphere of activity as political since their primary objective is to influence the policies of both national governments and IGOs. Thus, human rights INGOs, for instance, monitor, investigate, and publicize the behavior of states, lobby national governments and other IGOs, mobilize other interest groups, educate the public, and assist and support individuals and groups in their dealings with national officials or before courts and international organs.

GSOs perform two important functions. First, they are the governing bodies of their respective sports, and thus perform legislative, executive, and judiciary functions. Second, GSOs originated at the end of the nineteenth century, when sport was strictly an amateur activity, as non-profit-organizations designed to further the interests of individual sports, organize events, and promote sporting culture. They were not meant to be commercial enterprises. Yet, they have now acquired the capacity to generate and control billions of dollars, which has made them also profit-making structures. In this respect, unlike other types of non-profit global organizations with cultural or humanitarian objectives, GSOs are the only subset of INGOs to have come to resemble MNCs. One difference, however, remains: since GSOs are not owned, they have quite a bit of discretion in their use of commercially generated profits. Most academic studies have focused on sport organizations as administrative and management bodies (Slack 1997). Forster and Pope (2004) have recently analyzed the political economy of GSOs, focusing, in particular, on the problems arising from the contradiction existing between their non-profit status and their increasing ability to generate substantial amount of commercial revenues.

This article focuses on a more narrow question, namely that of legitimacy. According to Max Weber (1964), power can be exercised through authority, coercion or


persuasion. The governing function of an organization is effective and lasting only if its power is exercised mainly through authority. Persuasion and coercion can only be auxiliary instruments to be used in emergencies. To exercise their governing function GSOs need authority, which implies that the actors that are being governed, both individuals and other organizations, must hold the perception that the commands originating from GSOs are rightful and binding. GSOs, in other words, must be perceived as being legitimate. Legitimacy has become even more important as of recent because the commercialization of sport has made the governing function of GSOs a financially valuable property. The governing function belongs to GSOs by recognition and not as a legal right, and hence, without legitimacy, it would be challengeable, that is new organizations could make a claim for it and exercise it either in parallel or in competition. This article explores the sources of GSOs' legitimacy and argues that it is based on three different sets of networks (two formal and one informal) of which GSOs are part. Although each GSO is autonomous, they do not operate in isolation but within networks of sporting organizations. These networks, each in a different way, are the source of a process of mutual legitimization and hence authority for the GSOs, both inside and outside their own sporting spheres. Such a reciprocal legitimization process rests on the defense and promotion of mutual interests that the GSOs and other sporting organizations could not pursue effectively independently of each other.

The Pyramid Network

GSOs are the supreme governing bodies of sport. Individually and as a group they stand at the apex of global vertical networks of hierarchically structured governing bodies running from continental, to national, to local levels. We call these networks "pyramid networks" since the image of the pyramid well represents visually their hierarchical

character. In soccer, for instance, FIFA stands at the top of five continental bodies (AFC, CAF, CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, OFC and UEFA), which have below them national associations (e.g. the English FA, Soccer Australia, FIGC). These, in turn, are at the apex of other national, local or functional organizations. In Italy, for instance, FIGC is at the apex of a national network which includes the Lega Nazionale Professionisti, the Lega Professionisti C, the Lega Nazionale Dilettanti as well as functional organizations such as association of professional football players (AIC) and that of coaches (AIAC). Global pyramid networks (Fig. 1) headed by a GSO exist for all sports. Within each of them there exist other subordinate pyramid networks at the head of which there are continental and national organizations. In soccer for instance, the six continental federations are at the apex of as many continental pyramid networks while national federations are at the apex of national pyramid networks. All these pyramid networks are autonomous horizontally whether at the national or continental level. The English FA, for instance, has nothing to say about how soccer is organized or played in Italy nor does the FIGC have any saying about how soccer is played or organized in England. The same is true for the relationship about the continental federations. Each pyramid network, however, has to report, so to speak, to the organization at the apex of the pyramid network above it and of which it is part and all the soccer pyramid networks have in the end to report to the global soccer pyramid network headed by FIFA

Figure 1
Global Pyramid Networks
Vertical Hierarchy of Authority (subsidiarity) and [Process of Mutual Legitimization](#)



Each pyramid network has properties that appear necessary for both its own continued existence as well as that of the individual organizations that make it up. The most important of these properties appear to be the following:

- Recognition of the system as a whole (that is, the membership in, and the position of each member within, the global pyramid network) by each individual organization within the pyramid network.
- Recognition by both continental and national pyramid networks of other continental and national pyramid networks as independent and co-equal.
- Recognition of the organization at the apex of the global pyramid network (the GSO) as the supreme sport governing body for that sport.

Such recognition is extremely important if one considers that GSOs have come to play, especially thanks to television, important financial roles. Suffice to think of FIFA and its power to regulate not only the World Cup event but also various powerful professional leagues via transfer windows, rules concerning players' movement between clubs and

between national leagues as well as rules about their release for international competitions among national teams.

Occasionally there are tensions between these organizations. A persistent source of tension is the perceived paternalism and excessive direction from GSOs. In soccer, for instance, FIFA shares the duty of regulating the game with national and continental federations, each organization acting in its own geographical/functional sphere of competence, and, theoretically at least, according to the principle of subsidiarity. In practice however, because FIFA and continental federations are responsible for the organization of international competitions at both club and national team levels, the system is skewed in their favor. As FIFA President Joseph Blatter put it: “We [FIFA] have said clearly that, within their own country, they [national federations] can play soccer and organize it however they like, with whatever rules they like, and with whatever president they like, but they cannot expect to go OUTSIDE their country and play in OUR competitions’ (Radnege 2000 emphasis in original).

Although power can be exercised through authority, persuasion and coercion, the ability of GSOs to use the latter is limited to the imposition of economic sanctions. These function as a deterrent, but only as long as the economic and reputation costs they impose are higher than the perceived benefits. Luckily for GSOs, the latter is almost always the case in sport. A run-away professional soccer league that does not recognize the global soccer pyramid network is unlikely to be economically successful if it is boycotted from all other organizations in the pyramid network. It would be difficult to imagine an economically successful English Premier League, for instance, if its clubs could not take part in the European-wide competitions organized by UEFA and if its best players were not eligible for their respective national teams in competitions organized by UEFA and

FIFA. It was precisely such a threat on the part of UEFA and FIFA that deterred Media Partners, a private business group linked to the Fininvest conglomerate that owns the club A.C. Milan from setting up a European Super League by luring away from their respective national leagues fourteen of the most successful European clubs.⁴

Besides coercion, however, UEFA also had to resort to persuasion under the shape of economic incentives. It changed the format of the old European Champions Cup (now renamed UEFA Champions League) to assure the participation of the best European clubs even when they do not win their respective national leagues and increase the number of matches played by each participant club and hence their revenues. It also adopted a new sharing formula of the revenues generated by the competition which increased the percentage assigned to the participating clubs. Another example of the use of persuasion is FIFA's ability to punish or reward (and hence shape) the behavior of national federations by changing the amount of financial transfers to them (Darby 2001, Sugden 2003). GSOs' use of persuasion, however, is primarily directed not to the organizations within their pyramid network but to organizations outside it (states as well as organizations representing civil society) and the public at large. The GSOs' objective is to obtain what could be called "external" or "environmental" legitimization through what Jürgen Habermas has called "justificatory discourse" (Steffeck 2003). One of their preferred discourses is that they make a major contribution to the construction of a better and more peaceful world. This idea goes back to Pierre de Coubertin and was until 2004 reflected in the Fundamental Principles of the Olympic Charter which states that "the goal of Olympism is to place everywhere sport at the service of the harmonious

⁴ Ironically perhaps, amateur leagues and clubs have much more autonomy than professional ones. They could in fact easily function also in the absence of the recognition of the other members of the pyramid network. Amateur leagues and clubs moreover have little or no economic significance and hence their behavior cannot be easily modified by the threat of expulsion from the pyramid network.

development of man, with a view to establishing a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity. To this effect, the Olympic Movement engages, alone or in cooperation with other organizations and within the limits of its means, in actions to promote peace”.⁵ Most GSOs make similar claims. The International Baseball Federation (IBAF), for instance, claims that its aim is to create “respect between nations and their welfare and in this way to build a peaceful world”.⁶ FIFA’s President Joseph Blatter recently claimed that “soccer symbolizes values that cross frontiers, ethnic origins, religions, genders, and social classes”.⁷

Since the use of coercion and persuasion is limited, GSOs must exercise power primarily through authority. This means that they must be recognized as the legitimate, supreme, governing body by all other organizations within the pyramid network at the apex of which they stand. As shown in Figure 1 above, authority (indicated by the single pointed arrows) proceeds from top to bottom. The question is: what provides GSOs with their legitimacy? Where does it come from? The question is not trivial since most pyramid networks hardly exhibit internal democratic procedures. That is to say, GSOs are not necessarily representative bodies whose executive officers are clearly responsible and accountable to a democratically elected policy-making assembly composed of representatives of the organizations below. The IOC, for example, is still today a self-recruiting body. The National Olympic Committees (NOCs) are not represented on the IOC. Rather, the IOC appoints the heads of the NOCs who are considered IOC

⁵ See Point 3 of the Fundamental Principles of the Olympic Charter <<http://www.joc.or.jp/olympic/charter/pdf/olympiccharter200300e.pdf>>. In 2004 the Fundamental Principles were amended and Point 3 became a shorter and less ambitious Point 2 which now reads: “the goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity” <http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf>.

⁶ IBAF Statutes, Art. 6b <<http://www.baseball.ch/2003/f/statutes/stat.html>>

⁷ “Joseph Blatter dénonce une forme de babélisation du football”, *Le Monde*, 21 January 2003.

representatives or ambassadors to their own country. UEFA and the other continental soccer federations are not represented in FIFA, the GSO for soccer. They are apex organizations in their own right, albeit only in continental pyramid networks, which in turn are part of the global soccer pyramid network. So, if legitimacy does not derive from a process of democratic representation proceeding from the bottom up, where does it come from?

We argue that it derives primarily from the process of mutual recognition of the organizations belonging to the same pyramid network. In Figure 1 above the double-pointed arrows indicate this process of legitimization based on the mutual recognition and hence acceptance of one's station in the pyramid by all the organizations in it. The GSO recognizes and thereby legitimizes subordinate organizations. These, in turn, recognize the GSO as the apex organization and accept its role of supreme rule maker. Such a process of mutual recognition cum legitimization is based on common interests rather than on democratic mechanisms. There are, in other words, organizational interests that can be defended and promoted only if sport has a unified, hierarchical structure and a single supreme body. The pyramid network of course constrains the freedom of subordinate organizations in it, but also provides advantages that would not be easily attainable otherwise. The GSO has an obvious interest in the maintenance of such a hierarchical structure without which it would not exist. National organizations wish to retain their monopoly within their respective national arenas from upstart national competitors or international competitors. The GSO can guarantee the maintenance of their monopoly since it can exclude national competitors from hierarchy-based benefits (such as access to international competitions) by not recognizing them and hence making them pariahs. It can also protect the national organization from international competitors

since it controls also all other national pyramid networks. Indeed, examples of successful challenges to national organizations are rare.⁸ The GSO also provides benefits, both financial and in terms of international exposure by organizing international competitions which advance the fortunes of the sport and therefore also those of national organizations. In this context it suffices to think, for instance, of the role played by the World Cup organized by FIFA in the United States in 1994 for the advancement of the interests not only of the USSF (the national organization) but also of its affiliates such as the USYS, the AYSO and the various national leagues such as the MSL, the WUSA and the MISL. It should be noted, however, that not all sports have one single supreme, governing body. Some exceptions do exist. The presence of multiple supreme governing bodies in a sport does, however, present image problems as evidenced by professional boxing, which has led among other things to amateur boxing developing a separate, alternative organization. Multiple supreme governing bodies seem moreover to be a phenomenon limited to solo as opposed to team sports (e.g. chess, tennis). The reasons for this phenomenon have yet to be investigated.


The Olympic Network

GSOs legitimacy seems to be linked also to a different kind of network, the Olympic Network. The IOC is different from other GSOs, because of its pre-eminence and history and because it is an event-centered GSO rather than one devoted to a single sport. Its legitimacy derives from its carefully cultivated historical aura, as well as from a series of networks it has created around itself. These networks form, in turn, what we call the

⁸ Two relatively successful ones have occurred in Australia: the Super League in rugby and the World Series in cricket (Forster and Pope 2002).

Olympic Network (Figure 2), which, as in the case of pyramid networks, provides recognition and legitimacy to its members.

Figure 2
The Olympic Network



The Olympic Network is comprised of three different networks:

- National Olympic Committees – these bind national sport federations to the IOC.

As already mentioned the NOCs are creatures of, and subordinate to, the IOC. In essence, they do not have an independent existence, although they may be legally separate entities in each country. There are currently 202 NOCs grouped in five continental associations.

- International Sport Federations – these bind sports to the IOC via their GSOs.

They are grouped in four different categories:

- Association of Summer Olympic Federations (ASOIF) grouping sport represented at the summer Olympic Games;
 - Association of International Olympic Winter Federations (AIOFW), grouping sports represented at the winter Olympic Games;
 - Association of (the IOC)- Recognized International Sports Federations (ARISF);
 - General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF), grouping sports not yet represented in the Olympics Games.
- Olympic Movement Partners – This is a highly heterogeneous group of over 60 organizations recognized by the IOC “for their activities across the five continents”.⁹ The most important among them are:
 - Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) - created in 1983 by the IOC to solve dispute in-house and thus prevent the legal bodies of nation states from interfering in IOC business. In 1993, it became formally entirely

⁹ See <www.olympic.org>.

independent but it is still closely connected with the IOC through its officials.

- World Anti-doping Agency (WADA) – Established in 1999 to promote and coordinate the fight against doping in sport internationally.
- International Paralympic Committee (IPC) - the GSOs of sports for athletes with disabilities.
- The International Committee for Fair Play (ICFP) – Established in 1963, the aim of ICFP is to promote fair-play in observance of the Olympic principle that sport must be practiced “in a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play”. The ICFP confers annually various fair-play prizes to athletes chosen by sporting organizations as well as the public in general.
- The World Olympians Associations (WOA) – Established in 1994, the WOA aims at integrating over one hundred thousand Olympic athletes in the activities of the Olympic Network.

The Olympic Network (and the other networks it includes), much like the pyramid-networks, legitimizes all the organizations it comprises and the IOC in particular which can be said to have a hegemonic position within the world of sport. It is interesting to note for instance, that the IOC cobbled together this network, piece by piece during the last three decades, that is at a time when its economic power was increasing but its image, and hence its legitimacy, was under attack because of a series of scandals. The Olympic Network can be said to be similar to what is called “the United Nations family of organizations”, with the IOC playing the role of the UN itself. Sport organizations in the Olympic Network resemble UN member states in the sense that as UN membership has

come to be viewed as an essential property of statehood, thus IOC recognition has come to be seen as an essential characteristic of sport organizations. Sport organizations derive part of their legitimacy from IOC recognition, and hence membership in the Olympic Network.

The Swiss Network

Overlaid over the pyramid networks and the Olympic Network there is yet another network, which can be called the “Swiss network”. A significant numbers of GSOs have their headquarters in Switzerland. They include the IOC, FIFA and UEFA (soccer), ISU (skating), FIV (volleyball), FINA (swimming), FISA (rowing), IIHF (ice hockey), FILA (wrestling), FIS (skiing), FIM (motorcycling), UCI (cycling), IBAF (baseball), IHF (handball), FEI (equestrian sports), and IGF (gymnastics). The IOC was of course the first to establish itself there. Pierre de Coubertin moved his domicile (and hence the IOC) from Paris to Lausanne, in neutral Switzerland, during the First World War to keep the Olympic movement away from, and keep it above, the warring parties (Krüger 1999: 11). The cluster of GSOs in Switzerland could thus be probably explained through “pioneer mover-follower” and/or “dominant mover-follower” models. It can probably also be explained in economic terms, the same way it has been done for industrial clusters (Porter 1998, Viesti 2000). Briefly, firms (in this case GSOs) that are part of a cluster become more “competitive” because of a number of reasons. First, the existence of a cluster allows suppliers to realize important economies of scale which means that GSOs have access to factors of production in loco and at competitive costs. This is important when such factors are highly specialized (e.g. a labor force that is attuned, also linguistically, to the needs of international organizations). Second, the presence of competitors (other

GSOs but also INGOs and IGOs) stimulates diversification and innovation, which in the case of GSOs does not concern products but processes of marketing and promoting their sport and competitions. The presence of other GSOs, IGOs and INGOs, also reduces the costs of transactions and negotiations between them. Third, GSOs benefit from the existence of a socio-political and cultural climate favorable to the work of international organizations and thus from what can be called a kind of “accumulated social capital”. In particular, they also benefit from the secrecy rules of the Swiss commercial code, which threatens whistle blowing as a criminal offence for revealing secret commercial information. This gives additional protection to what are already highly unaccountable, if not secretive organizations. The IOC has, for instance, used such provisions against the investigative journalist Andrew Jennings. When, encouraged by FIFPro (the International Federation of Football Players), the Belgian football player Marc Bosman initiated action against UEFA claiming that its transfer rules and nationality clauses had damaged his career, UEFA tried to have the case thrown out by arguing – unsuccessfully however - that as a Swiss legal entity it was beyond the jurisdiction of a Belgian court (Blanpain 1996: 5 and 141).

Whatever its origins and the reasons for such a choice of location, the Swiss cluster represents another network that contributes to the legitimization of GSOs. Switzerland itself, in fact, provides a form of legitimization by association. Its national image is strongly associated with the concept of neutrality and such a concept, when transferred to GSOs by association, contributes to their image of technical bodies above politics or petty divisions as well as to their “justificatory discourse” as purveyor of international understanding and peace. Such an image is also reinforced by the presence in Switzerland of the headquarters of many IGOs and INGOs, which are usually regarded

in a very favorable light, as the cornerstone of a vibrant, international civil society in the making.

Conclusions: towards the sport governance network

Although it can be argued that GSOs are not fully democratic organizations, they nevertheless are able to create and confer upon one another a degree of legitimization from their membership in a series of diverse and overlapping networks. Legitimacy can thus exist also in the presence of limited, or faulty, democratic procedures. GSOs need legitimacy also to protect their independent and autonomous governing role within their specific sporting arenas. Such independence and autonomy, however, is increasingly being called into question because of the increasing commercial and economic significance of sport, which have made sport organizations increasingly look like economic firms. This has led political authorities to begin contesting, competing, and cooperating with GSOs for the regulation of sport. Indeed, it can be said a fourth network has been emerging, a network that can be called the “sport governance network”. GSOs, in other words, no longer have a monopoly over the governing of their sport but are becoming mere “governance bodies”, that is to say they have to compete and cooperate, through formal structures and informal practices, with other bodies (private and public, economic, social, and political, as well as national and trans-national) in regulating the international activities of sport.

The most famous example of this new trend is the compromise agreement concerning the player transfer system in soccer reached by UEFA, FIFA, the European Commission and a score of other stakeholders, which included EU member states, soccer national federations, as well as FIFPro. The European Commission acted as a kind of

coxswain, guiding negotiations so that the outcome would be consonant with the principles and rules of the European Community but leaving the choice of details to the sporting organizations. Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, for instance, referred to his role in the negotiations as that of a “referee” explaining “the ground rules and how they are applied.” He also pointed out that the way to avoid old conflicts between the Commission and sport authorities was to adopt “modern rules of governance”.¹⁰ FIFA and UEFA, on the other hand, seemed intent on tenaciously fending off at least the image of their waning governing monopoly. Upon reaching a compromise agreement with the European Commission, FIFA President Joseph Blatter, for instance, publicly thanked Commissioner Monti with words that gave the impression that the Commission had simply acted upon request as a consultant to FIFA to improve its transfer rules.¹¹

On the basis of the arguments advanced in this paper, however, GSOs should not fear the advent and the consolidation a “governance network”. The existence of such a network, in fact, while constraining the supreme governing role played by GSOs also contributes to legitimize, and hence cement even further, the central role they play in the management of their respective sports.

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¹¹ Letter of Blatter to Monti, 5 March 2001.

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Acronyms of Sporting Organizations

AFC	Asian Football Confederation
AIC	Associazione Italiana Calciatori
AIAC	Associazione Italiana Allenatori Calcio
AIOFW	Association of International Olympic Winter Federations
ARISF	Association of Recognised (dallo IOC) International Sports Federations
ASOIF	Association of Summer Olympic Federations
AYSO	American Youth Soccer Organization
CAF	Confédération Africaine de Football
CAS	Court of Arbitration for Sport

CONCACAF	Confederation of North, Central American, and Caribbean Association Football
CONMEBOL	Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol
GAISF	General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF)
GSO	Global Sport Organizations
FA	Football Association (England)
FEI	Fédération Equestre Internationale
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIFPro	Fédération internationale des footballeurs professionnels
FIGC	Federazione Italiana Gioco Calcio
FILA	Fédération Internationale des Lutttes Associées
FIM	Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme
FINA	Fédération Internationale de Natation
FIS	Fédération Internationale de Ski
FISA	Fédération Internationale des Sociétés d'Aviron
FIV	Fédération Internationale de Volleyball
IBAF	International Baseball Federation
ICFP	International Committee for Fair Play
IGF	International Gymnastic Federation
IHF	International Handball Federation
IIHF	International Ice Hockey Federation
IOC	International Olympic Committee
IPC	International Paralympic Committee
ISU	International Skating Union
MISL	Major Indoor Soccer League
MSL	Major Soccer League
NOC	National Olympic Committees
OFC	Oceania Football Confederation
UEFA	Union des Associations Européennes de Football
UCI	Union Cycliste Internationale
USSF	US Soccer Federation
USYS	United States Youth Soccer
WADA	World Anti-Doping Agency
WOA	World Olympians Associations
WUSA	Women's United Soccer Association